## Format/Explanation

1AC = assume the Taiwan aff

1NC = assume the one here

2AC = read the one here — no time limit

CX of 2AC = 1 minute

2NC = 4 minutes

CX of 2NC = 1 minute

1AR = 1 minute 30 seconds

2NR = 5 minutes

2AR = 5 minutes

## Negative

### 1NC — Topicality “No QPQs”

#### Engagement must be unconditional — it’s *distinct* from conditional policies. QPQ plans are not topical.

Smith 5 — Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations and Director of the European Foreign Policy Unit at the London School of Economics, 2005 (“Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,” *Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement*, May, Available Online at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/484.pdf, Accessed 07-25-2013, p. 23)

First, a few definitions. ‘Engagement’ is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government and/or civil society and/or business community of another state. The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic practices, and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways. Most cases of engagement entail primarily building economic links, and encouraging trade and investment in particular. Some observers have variously labelled this strategy one of interdependence, or of ‘oxygen’: economic activity leads to positive political consequences.19

‘Conditionality’, in contrast, is the linking, by a state or international organisation, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid or trade concessions) to the fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions. ‘Positive conditionality’ entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; ‘negative conditionality’ involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions (in other words, applying sanctions, or a strategy of ‘asphyxiation’).20 To put it simply, engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings. In another way of looking at it, engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to induce change in another country, conditionality more of a top-down strategy.

#### Vote negative because the plan doesn’t meet the best definition of “engagement” — key to precise limits and predictable ground. Broad definitions *over-generalize*, undermining conceptual clarity.

#### *“Good”* isn’t good *enough* — *manageable* limits require an *enforceable* brightline. A strict definition of the topic mechanism is a prerequisite for *in-depth research* and *robust clash* over core issues.

### Overview

#### Giving the aff QPQs exponentially increases topic scope and neg research burden because every *quid* can be linked with any *quo*. The plan links [quid] to [quo] — but could link it to *anything*: general or specific democratic or electoral reforms, economic liberalization measures, human rights protections, trade policies, international votes, etc. The list of potential conditions for China is enormous.

#### This is uniquely damaging to *quantitative* and *qualitative* limits:

#### 1. Unpredictable research — conditions can be anything. Only the *quid* has to be topical, not the *quo*. Affs can claim advantages based on the *quo*, nullifying neg topic preparation.

#### 2. Bidirectionality — affs can make offers that China will *refuse* and claim “*hardline policy good*” advantages that don’t link to “engagement bad” generics.

#### 3. No functional limit — standards for solvency evidence are weak and unenforceable. Letting in a few high-quality affs isn’t worth letting in dozens of low-quality affs.

#### A more limited topic facilitates in-depth clash over core controversies. Repeating these debates challenges students to think critically, rigorously prepare, and innovate within constraints. An unlimited topic incentivizes overly-generic neg approaches that sacrifice clash and depth.

#### Even *modestly* better limits outweigh aff impacts — crucial to both fairness and education.

### They Say: “We Meet”

#### 1. The plan links [quid] to the fulfillment of conditions regarding [quo] — it *attaches strings*. This is conditionality, not engagement—that’s Smith.

#### 2. By definition, the plan is conditionality.

Reinhard 10 — Janine Reinhard, Research Fellow and Ph.D. Candidate at the Department for Politics and Management at Konstanz University in Germany, 2010 (“EU Democracy Promotion Through Conditionality In Its Neighborhood: The Temptation of Membership Perspective or Flexible Integration?,” *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, Volume 4, Issue 3, Summer, Available Online at http://www.cria-online.org/Journal/12/Done\_EU\_Democracy\_Promotion\_through\_Conditionality\_in\_its\_Neighbourhood\_Janine\_Reinhard.pdf, Accessed 07-28-2013, p. 200)

How Does Conditionality Work?

Conditionality can be defined as an agreement between two actors, in which actor 1 offers a reward to actor 2.11 This reward is granted if actor 2 fulfils certain conditions. In the case the conditions are not met by actor 2 the reward is simply withheld (positive conditionality) or punishment follows (negative conditionality). To exert conditionality as a reward-based policy between two actors, asymmetric negotiation power has to be in place: actor 1 has to be able to offer attractive incentives which actor 2 wants to have and cannot achieve easily otherwise.

When analysing social interaction from an incentives- and interest-based position, conditionality is first of all understood as a mode of action. Additionally, it can be used purposely as a political strategy to exert a reward-based policy between two political actors and to institutionalize asymmetric interaction. Conditionality can be used to promote democracy by combining attractive rewards with certain conditions of democratic development. In this case, this study will adopt the term “democratic conditionality”.

#### 3. Offering a *quid pro quo* is conditionality.

Tocci 7 — Nathalie Tocci, Senior Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Italy, 2007 (“The EU's role in conflict resolution: a framework of analysis,” *The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard*, Published by Routledge, ISBN 1134123388, p. 10)

Conditionality

Particularly over the last decade and in the process of the eastern enlargement, the EU has developed its policies of conditionality as a means to transform the governing structures, the economy and the civil society of the candidate countries. Generally, conditionality can be defined as a strategy whereby a reward is granted or withheld depending on the fulfilment of an attached condition. More specifically, 'political conditionality entails the linking, by a state or international organization, of perceived benefits to another state, to the fulfilment of conditions relating to the protection of human rights and the advancement of democratic principles' (Smith 1998: 256). Obligations can thus be political and economic, as well as technical, legal, institutional and related to the EU's acquis communautaire.

Conditionality can be positive or negative, ex ante or ex post. Positive conditionality entails the promise of a benefit, in return for the fulfilment of a predetermined condition. Both the promise and the obligation are specified in the contract. It is most frequently used in the delivery of economic assistance, as well as within the context of EU accession. Negative conditionality involves the infliction of a punishment in the event of the violation of a specified obligation. Diplomatic and economic sanctions on Serbia (1991-2000), Syria (1987-94), Libya (1987-92/1999-03) and Belarus (1998-9) are clear cases of negative conditionality.

#### 4. Economic engagement excludes short-term policies — it must be unconditional.

Çelik 11 — Arda Can Çelik, Graduate Student in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University (Sweden), 2011 (*Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies*, Published by GRIN Verlag, ISBN 9783640962907, p. 11)

Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender state to change the political behaviour of target state. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes. (Kahler&Kastner, 2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway to perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows “It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations’’. (p523-abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that ‘’the direct and positive linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction.’’

### They Say: “C/I Only QPQs”

#### 1. Limits DA — that was the overview. Conditional QPQs explode the topic both *quantitatively* and *qualitatively*. This undermines in-depth clash.

#### 2. Precision DA — there is a conceptual distinction between engagement and conditionality. Scholarly consensus is neg — they are *separate tools*.

Diamond 1 — Larry Diamond, Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Stanford University, Founding Co-Director of the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from Stanford University, 2001 (“Building a World of Liberal Democracies,” *Foreign Policy for America in the Twenty-First Century: Alternative Perspectives*, Edited by Thomas H. Henriksen, Published by Hoover Press, ISBN 081792793X, p. 70-71)

Tactics and Tools for Promoting Democracy

It is beyond the scope of this essay to review in detail the specific tools we have available for promoting democracy.21 The broad categories are political assistance; economic assistance and incentives; economic and [end page 70] political engagement; conditionality for aid, debt relief, and entry into regional unions; diplomatic pressure; and military intervention.

#### 3. Precision is vital to policy-relevant education — clearly *differentiating* between engagement and conditionality is vital to effective foreign policymaking.

Gowan 5 — Richard Gowan, Associate Director at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, has consulted for the UN Secretariat and the UK Department for International Development, 2005 (“Preface,” *Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement*, May, Available Online at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/484.pdf, Accessed 07-28-2013, p. vii-viii)

Engagement and conditionality: moving forwards

How should we address these flaws in European strategy? The authors in this volume offer elements of a strategic framework resting on greater clarity, consistency and vision in the employment of conditionality and engagement. As Michael Emerson indicates, this should involve not only the reform of our methods and practices, but also of our institutional framework. Richard Whitman suggests that an enhanced framework may require new EU agencies operating beyond its borders. These are deliberately far-reaching proposals. To achieve them, some shorter-term tactical decisions may be necessary.

Recent debates over the European futures of Turkey and the Ukraine, fuelled by referendums on the constitutional treaty, [end page vii] have created an impression that the problem of overstretch has already had a corrosive effect on Europe’s political will. In the course of 2005, the EU must explicitly reaffirm its commitment to these two countries, far apart as they are already are on the road to accession. In October, the Commission will launch a new phase of negotiations with Turkey, while an EU-Ukraine summit will offer a significant platform for a clear statement of intent from the Union – it may be time for a ‘big noise’ on the Ukraine.

A similar act of reassurance may also be required in the Western Balkans, where a committee of experts has recently identified ‘pessimism and dissatisfaction’ undermining reform processes. 5 More generally, European officials should take every opportunity to give concrete demonstrations that engagement is not ‘tokenism’ – yet they must also build on recent efforts to reassure Moscow that the EU’s goal is partnership with Russia, not competition. 6

Moreover, the European institutions should work with governments to ensure that current debates over the proposed EU ‘Foreign Minister’ and External Action Service should be more than lowest-common-denominator turf wars. In rethinking our institutional frameworks, we should aim not for retrenchment, but a more credible set of tools for employing ‘soft power’ resources. By combining clearer doctrines of engagement and conditionality with the mechanisms required to enforce them, we may begin to take firmer control of our power of attraction – and to use it to greater effect.

#### 4. This turns education and beats reasonability: there are s*erious policy differences* between engagement and conditionality — choosing the right tool is essential for foreign policy success.

Smith 5 — Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations and Director of the European Foreign Policy Unit at the London School of Economics, 2005 (“Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,” *Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement*, May, Available Online at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/484.pdf, Accessed 07-25-2013, p. 23-24)

There are well-known advantages and disadvantages to both approaches. Engagement can help to establish the conditions [end page 23] under which democratic principles and human rights, for example, can be protected. It can foster the long-term processes (learning; development of a middle class; strengthening of the freedom of the press) that allow local actors to effect political and economic change. Engagement challenges sovereignty less than conditionality does, and so will be more acceptable to governments. It could be more effective to persuade governments to comply with liberal norms than to coerce them to do so – as coercion may simply induce stubborn resistance.

But put ‘constructive’ in front of the term, and some of its negative connotations become clearer: constructive engagement with apartheid South Africa was criticised for allowing Western/Northern governments (in particular the US and UK) to continue with business as usual, putting at risk no important commercial exchanges, yet to claim to domestic audiences that quiet diplomacy was more effective. Engagement, in other words, can allow trade and investment to proceed unhindered even with quite despicable regimes.

But there is another, more practical problem with engagement: such a strategy will work only if domestic actors want to trade, invest, ‘engage’ with the target state. Where practices are so illiberal as to make the economic environment unattractive, or where conditions are impossible (in war-torn states, for example), or where the general state of development or level of natural resources is low, engagement does not seem likely to work well.

A strategy of conditionality has the potential to be quite effective if the target state wants the benefits on offer or fears losing them. Some observers have argued that conditionality is of most use in encouraging countries to improve their human rights records or implement specific economic reforms, but is not well suited for grander objectives such as encouraging democracy (which depends overwhelmingly on local conditions and cannot be imposed by outsiders). But there are serious drawbacks to using conditionality, and negative conditionality in particular.

#### 5. No Intent To Define — Sutter defines “conditional engagement,” but doesn’t say all engagement is conditional.

#### 6. Bidirectionality DA — their interpretation results in “say no” affs and affs that threaten negative incentives. These dodge core neg prep.

Smith 5 — Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations and Director of the European Foreign Policy Unit at the London School of Economics, 2005 (“Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,” *Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement*, May, Available Online at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/484.pdf, Accessed 07-25-2013, p. 26)

But regardless of why there is the reluctance to use negative conditionality, the outcome is inconsistent. Yet arguably, you cannot use positive conditionality exclusively: once ‘carrots are consumed’ (the benefits offered and taken up), there must be a way to keep up the pressure on third countries to continue with or at least not reverse reforms. Conditionality, in other words, is necessarily one coin with two sides.

#### 7. Contextual evidence proves there’s a *distinction*.

Gowan 5 — Richard Gowan, Associate Director at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, has consulted for the UN Secretariat and the UK Department for International Development, 2005 (“Preface,” *Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement*, May, Available Online at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/484.pdf, Accessed 07-28-2013, p. iii)

This note of caution captures a recurrent dilemma for the EU that may come to both characterise and retard its evolution as a strategic actor: how can and should we control the spread of our own influence? As the authors in this volume emphasise, Europe’s power rests on its ability to exploit its ‘attractive pull’ through policies of engagement and conditionality. But in trying to direct and ration access to our resources, we risk being overwhelmed: democratic revolutions and political and economic opportunities will frequently force new temptations and obligations upon us.

### They Say: “Predictability DA”

#### Our interpretation is universally relevant and best for debate.

#### 1. Most predictable — Smith uses “engagement” as a term of art, has an explicit intent to define, and is a Professor of IR at the London School of Economics—the second-ranked IR school in the world\*.

\* = <http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/university-subject-rankings/2013/politics>

#### 2. *Does* apply — contextual evidence.

Apodaca 6 — Clair Apodaca, Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech, holds a Ph.D. from Purdue University, 2006 (“Selling Off Human Rights: The Clinton Administration,” *Understanding U.S. Human Rights Policy: A Paradoxical Legacy*, Published by Routledge, ISBN 1135448191, p. Google Books — no page numbers indicated)

In order to get around congressional mandates restricting the amount of foreign aid given to human rights-abusing states, Clinton copiously issued waivers to avoid sanctions. For example, although the Clinton Administration had agreed to the provisions of the Helms-Burton and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Acts,11 it was quick to utilize waivers to dismiss the requirements specified in these legislations (Eizenstat 1998). According to the Clinton Administration, not applying sanctions proved to be the best way of helping U.S. allies against enemies on human rights issues. Once again, the Clinton Administration's position was that economic engagement was the best method to encourage repressive regimes to modify their human rights abuses. Congressionally imposed coercive enforcement mechanisms, such as sanctions, linkages, or conditionalities, in the opinion of the Clinton Administration, were of dubious value in the pursuit of the White House's foreign policy goals of democratic enlargement (Shattuck 1999). Sanctions could restrict the Clinton Administration's ability to economically engage brutal regimes. Furthermore, third party sanctions, like the Helms-Burton Law, greatly reduced U.S. corporations' ability to conduct trade. USA\*Engage calculated that, because of sanctions, the United States' economy lost approximately $19 billion every year in exports and 200,000 high-wage jobs (Wright 2001, A1). Hence, economic issues again dominated foreign policy behavior.

#### 3. Not overcontextualized — European lessons important and applicable.

Kelley 4 — Judith G. Kelley, Assistant Professor of Public Policy Studies and Political Science at Duke University, 2004 (“Conclusion,” *Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives*, Published by Princeton University Press, ISBN 1400835658, p. 192-193)

Sui Generis

While history may repeat itself, this seldom means that we can expect much actual resemblance over time. Thus, asking how well these findings transfer to other institutions, non-European regions, and other uses of conditionality is entirely appropriate. First, the EU is clearly unique. But there have been similar uses of conditionality in NATO and in WTO entrance negotiations. The Organization of American States and Mersocur (Southern Common Market) have also had human-rights related requirements. The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which has used political criteria in its development assistance committee, is also debating more overt membership criteria for the swelling applicant [end page 192] pool. Thus, "clubs" will continue to play a large part in global cooperation. Lessons about inclusion and exclusion may apply to them. As the United States promotes a free trade area in the Middle East and in general, and as free trade areas arise in other regions, the natural impulse will be for inclusion. This study implies that the point of leverage is greatest before entry. Thus, while the creation of other attractive organizations depends on the inclusion of key states, their establishment may also build potential for promoters of political liberalization to use a more gradual admission to encourage democratic reforms. Thus, a careful balance exists between inclusion to build an organization, and exclusion to exert leverage. In sum, the lessons of normative pressure and membership conditionality promise to have increasing relevance as nations reshape global cooperation.

Second is the question of whether these findings are limited to the European arena. Even if this is the case, this would not make the study meaningless because Europe continues [to] have great implications for the rest of the world. Also, the insights apply to broader European regions as such candidates as Turkey and the Balkan States queue for membership. To date, however, the use of political conditionality in other regions is scant. Like the IMF and World Bank "good governance" requirements, which in some cases includes respect for human rights and political freedoms, most uses of political conditionality in other regions are related to economic assistance, as for example the human rights clauses in the EU aid program. This complicates parallels to political conditionality in connection with organizational membership. Regional organizations are changing rapidly, however, and comparative work on their design and efficacy is emerging.22 Further, while current regional comparisons are weak, the findings may extend to other geographical regions in the future.

Finally, the theoretical implications about membership conditionality may extend to other incentive use. The model of in-depth engagement and clear conditionality may align well with evaluations of aid conditionality, that suggest an increased need for "ownership," which, though different from normative pressure, is not unrelated in that it points to the need for engagement and dialogue.

#### 4. Engagement and conditionality are competing strategies — *yes*, this is in the context of the United States.

Smith 5 — Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations and Director of the European Foreign Policy Unit at the London School of Economics, 2005 (“Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,” *Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement*, May, Available Online at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/484.pdf, Accessed 07-25-2013, p. 26-27)

Now, as to whether the two strategies of engagement and conditionality are incompatible or mutually reinforcing, important questions to consider are whether the strategies are to be applied by the same actor (the EU, in our case) or by different [end page 26] international actors (the EU and the US, say), and whether both strategies are to be used on the same target country, or within the same region (south-eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Mediterranean), or globally. We already have several cases in which the EU and the US have used different strategies towards the same country: Cuba, Iran, and Libya spring to mind. The US has tried to ‘asphyxiate’ all three countries, the EU has taken a much softer stance – in particular offering engagement, but with conditions attached. Granted, there is little coordination between the US and EU over strategies, but in none of those cases can we categorically say that the combination of strategies has been mutually reinforcing – which does not augur well for the use of both by the same actor towards the same country.

There are also clear difficulties in using both strategies within the same region or even globally. This is because, inevitably, some target countries will question why they are subjected to conditionality while others are not. Unless this can be justified to outsiders (as well as to any domestic critics) the impact of both strategies could be diminished: in one case because conditionality could spark resistance, in the other because engagement could be seen by the target government as implying it has a free hand to do as it pleases.

### They Say: “QPQ Ground DA”

#### Protecting the neg from unpredictable *affs* is more important than protecting the aff from unpredictable *counterplans*.

#### 1. Stasis point — debate is unproductive if the neg isn’t ready to clash with the plan. The aff always has ground — they choose the 1AC and can weigh the case.

#### 2. Easier for aff — general defenses of unconditional engagement respond to every QPQ, so counterplans aren’t unpredictable. Aff also gets theory and competition ground. Neg doesn’t.

#### 3. Incentives worse — *QPQ-counterplan-of-the-week* is doesn’t change overall quality of debates. Affs will adapt with “unconditional key” advantages. *QPQ-aff-of-the-week* is much worse. Neg can’t keep up without *add-a-condition-counterplan-of-the-week* and bad hypergenerics, ruining the topic.

### They Say: “Functional Limits

#### 1. Standards for solvency advocates aren’t consistent or enforceable — that was the overview.

#### 2. Counterplans don’t constrain the aff — competition and theory arguments weaken unconditional and add-a-condition counterplans, but aff still gets unpredictable advantages.

### They Say: “Good is Good Enough”

#### 1. *Manageable* limits require an *enforceable* brightline. A strict definition of the topic mechanism is a prerequisite for *in-depth research* and *robust clash* over core issues — that was the overview.

#### 2. Their interpretation is unreasonable — it explodes the topic and makes in-depth preparation too difficult.

#### 3. Topicality is an a priori jurisdictional voting issue — if the plan isn’t topical, the judge should vote neg because the plan is outside the scope of their authority.

#### 4. “Competing interpretations” best for *this topic*:

#### A. Definitional precision is a precondition for educational, policy-relevant debates about “engagement”.

Resnick 1 — Evan Resnick, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University, holds an M.Phil. in Political Science and an M.A. in Political Science from Columbia University, 2001 (“Defining engagement,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 54, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ABI/INFORM Complete)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

#### B. Carefully defining “engagement” is necessary for effective debate — topicality is important and won’t be a “*race to the bottom*.”

Resnick 1 — Evan Resnick, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University, holds an M.Phil. in Political Science and an M.A. in Political Science from Columbia University, 2001 (“Defining engagement,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 54, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ABI/INFORM Complete)

While the term "engagement" enjoys great consistency and clarity of meaning in the discourse of romantic love, it enjoys neither in the discourse of statecraft. Currently, practitioners and scholars of American foreign policy are vigorously debating the merits of engagement as a strategy for modifying the behavior of unsavory regimes. The quality of this debate, however, is diminished by the persistent inability of the US foreign policy establishment to advance a coherent and analytically rigorous conceptualization of engagement. In this essay, I begin with a brief survey of the conceptual fog that surrounds engagement and then attempt to give a more refined definition. I will use this definition as the basis for drawing a sharp distinction between engagement and alternative policy approaches, especially appeasement, isolation and containment.

In the contemporary lexicon of United States foreign policy, few terms have been as frequently or as confusingly invoked as that of engagement.1 A growing consensus extols the virtues of engagement as the most promising policy for managing the threats posed to the US by foreign adversaries. In recent years, engagement constituted the Clinton administration's declared approach in the conduct of bilateral relations with such countries as China, Russia, North Korea and Vietnam.

Robert Suettinger, a onetime member of the Clinton administration's National Security Council, remarked that the word engagement has "been overused and poorly defined by a variety of policymakers and speechwriters" and has "become shopworn to the point that there is little agreement on what it actually means."2 The Clinton foreign policy team attributed five distinct meanings to engagement:3

1) A broad-based grand strategic orientation: In this sense, engagement is considered synonymous with American internationalism and global leadership. For example, in a 1993 speech, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake observed that American public opinion was divided into two rival camps: "On the one side is protectionism and limited foreign engagement; on the other is active American engagement abroad on behalf of democracy and expanded trade."4

2) A specific approach to managing bilateral relations with a target state through the unconditional provision of continuous concessions to that state: During the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton criticized the Bush administration's "ill-advised and failed" policy of "constructive engagement" toward China as one that "coddled the dictators and pleaded for progress, but refused to impose penalties for intransigence."5

3) A bilateral policy characterized by the conditional provision of concessions to a target state: The Clinton administration announced in May 1993 that the future extension of Most Favored Nation trading status to China would be conditional on improvements in the Chinese government's domestic human rights record.6 Likewise, in the Agreed Framework signed by the US and North Korea in October 1994, the US agreed to provide North Korea with heavy oil, new light-water nuclear reactors and eventual diplomatic and economic normalization in exchange for a freeze in the North's nuclear weapons program.7

4) A bilateral policy characterized by the broadening of contacts in areas of mutual interest with a target state: Key to this notion of engagement is the idea that areas of dialogue and fruitful cooperation should be broadened and not be held hostage through linkage to areas of continuing disagreement and friction. The Clinton administration inaugurated such a policy toward China in May 1994 by declaring that it would not tie the annual MFN decision to the Chinese government's human rights record.8 Similarly, the administration's foreign policy toward the Russian Federation has largely been one of engagement and described as an effort to "build areas of agreement and ... develop policies to manage our differences."9

5) A bilateral policy characterized by the provision of technical assistance to facilitate economic and political liberalization in a target state: In its 1999 national security report, the White House proclaimed that its "strategy of engagement with each of the NIS [Newly Independent States]" consisted of "working with grassroots organizations, independent media, and emerging entrepreneurs" to "improve electoral processes and help strengthen civil society," and to help the governments of the NIS to "build the laws, institutions and skills needed for a market democracy, to fight crime and corruption [and] to advance human rights and the rule of law."10

Unfortunately, scholars have not fared better than policymakers in the effort to conceptualize engagement because they often make at least one of the following critical errors: (1) treating engagement as a synonym for appeasement; (2) defining engagement so expansively that it essentially constitutes any policy relying on positive sanctions; (3) defining engagement in an unnecessarily restrictive manner.

## Affirmative

### 2AC — Topicality “No QPQs”

#### 1. Economic and Diplomatic Engagement Must Be *Conditional* — counter-interpretation best for China. We meet.

Sutter 98 — Robert G. Sutter, Professor of Practice in International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, former Senior Specialist and Director of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the Congressional Research Service, former National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and the Pacific at the U.S. Government's National Intelligence Council, former China Division Director at the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, holds a Ph.D. in History and East Asian Languages from Harvard University, 1998 (“Convergence and Conflict in U.S.-China Policy, 1996-1997,” *U.S. Policy Toward China: An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups*, Published by Rowman & Littlefield, ISBN 0847687252, p. 84)

The thrust of conditional engagement is to bring the PRC into the community of nations through China’s acceptance of basic rules of international conduct. In general order of priority, those rules focus heavily first on military and security questions, notably opposition to PRC use of force against Taiwan or other countries and opposition to PRC proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technology; then economic issues such as access to the Chinese market, Chinese adherence to world IPR standards, labor practices, and related questions; and finally issues of values such as human rights and democracy.

The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage Chinese compliance with accepted international norms by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice. Both are hedges against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China. The strategy would require clear positive and negative incentives contained within U.S. policy, though how and when those incentives are used depend on circumstances.

The priorities of conditional engagement reflect a comprehensive assessment—arguably rare in U.S. policymaking—not only of what the United States cares about, but also of how much an issue weighs in overall U.S. national interests; how influential U.S. action may be in changing Chinese behavior; how best to elicit a desired Chinese response; and how to deal with effective Chinese defiance.

#### 2. QPQ Ground DA — conditioning debates are inevitable, but QPQs are crucial aff ground. Too hard for aff to generate offense against QPQ counterplans given 2AC time constraints, but neg has *reactive ground* and *the block* to develop depth. *Add-a-condition counterplans* filter out low-quality affs.

#### 3. Predictability DA — neg interp over-contextualized to *Europe* and *foreign aid*, not U.S. China policy. Topic literature should define boundaries. Unpredictable limits arbitrarily exclude core cases, reducing preparation incentives and harming education. Can’t master U.S. China policy without debating QPQs.

#### 4. Plan “Builds Close Ties” — *we meet* Smith’s definition of “engagement.”

#### 5. Functional Limits Prevent Explosion — *solvency advocates* and *counterplans* constrain aff choice.

#### 6. Good Is Good Enough — search for best definition *endless* and distracts from topic education. Debatability outweighs precision — *wrong forum* for pursuit of definitional perfection.

### 1AR Overview

#### 1. QPQ debates are inevitable — the only question is whether the aff gets QPQ plans or the neg gets QPQ counterplans. Their generic “limits” impact misidentifies the nexus issue.

#### 2. Overlimiting is worse — it throws the baby out with the bathwater, sacrificing quality debates at the altar of predictability.

#### They say “unpredictable advantages,” but every condition must be tied to an offer of engagement — neg should be prepared.

#### They say “bidirectionality,” but neg can counterplan to sanction — “*hardline policy good*” advantages are easily defeated.

#### They say “no functional limits,” but affs need a solvency advocate and answers to counterplans. Most QPQ affs are unstrategic — only core conditions are viable.

### C/I Only QPQs

#### Diplomatic and economic engagement with China must be conditional. Engagement is a strategy for bringing China into the international order by changing China’s behavior. It requires figuring out how to best elicit the desired Chinese response via careful design of QPQs — that’s Sutter, a China policy expert writing in the context of U.S. China policy.

#### Our interpretation is most predictable because it’s contextualized to U.S. diplomatic engagement with China.

Baum and Shevchenko 1 — Richard Baum, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California-Los Angeles, and Alexei Shevchenko, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the University of California-Los Angeles, 2001 (“China and the Forces of Globalization,” *The New Great Power Coalition: Toward a World Concert of Nations*, Published by Rowman & Littlefield, ISBN 0742510093, p. 81)

On a number of crucial issues dividing China and the West, hard-nosed bargaining—rather than normative consensus—has been the mainstay of diplomatic engagement. During the October 1997 Clinton-Jiang summit, for example, in exchange for an American agreement to expedite the granting of U.S. export licenses to suppliers of nuclear power-generating equipment, China provided a written assurance that it would not engage in new nuclear weapons-related technology transfers to Iran. Similarly, much of the progress achieved at the June 1998 Sino-American presidential summit was due to President Clinton’s agreement to affirm publicly a policy of “three noes” governing American relations with Taiwan: no support for Taiwanese independence, no support for a “two Chinas” policy, and no support for Taiwanese membership in the UN or any other state-based international organization. Similar quid-pro-quo bargains, many of them only tacit, have been struck in the past, including annual American renewal of MFN in exchange for the release of Chinese political prisoners, and a Chinese crackdown on domestic software pirates in exchange for a softening of American conditions for Chinese entry into the WTO.

#### Smith is wrong — only conditional engagement is government-to-government. Unconditional engagement isn’t topical.

Haass and O’Sullivan 2k — Richard N. Haass, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, former senior aide to President George Bush, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, 2000 (“Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies,” *Survival*, Volume 42, Number 2, Summer, Available Online at <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf>, Accessed 05-06-2013, p. 2)

Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private sector in the hopes of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation.

#### Diplomatic engagement requires direct government-to-government talks.

Crocker 9 — Chester A. Crocker, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1981 to 1989, 2009 (“Terms of Engagement,” *New York Times*, September 14th, Available Online at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/opinion/14crocker.html?\_r=0, Accessed 07-18-2013)

Let’s get a few things straight. Engagement in statecraft is not about sweet talk. Nor is it based on the illusion that our problems with rogue regimes can be solved if only we would talk to them. Engagement is not normalization, and its goal is not improved relations. It is not akin to détente, working for rapprochement, or appeasement.

So how do you define an engagement strategy? It does require direct talks. There is simply no better way to convey authoritative statements of position or to hear responses. But establishing talks is just a first step. The goal of engagement is to change the other country’s perception of its own interests and realistic options and, hence, to modify its policies and its behavior.

Diplomatic engagement is proven to work — in the right circumstances. American diplomats have used it to change the calculations and behavior of regimes as varied as the Soviet Union, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Cuba, China, Libya and, intermittently, Syria.

#### That’s *only* conditional engagement.

Haass and O’Sullivan 2k — Richard N. Haass, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, former senior aide to President George Bush, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, 2000 (“Engaging Problem Countries,” Brookings Institution, June, Available Online at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2000/06/sanctions-haass, Accessed 05-06-2013)

Engagement as a policy is not merely the antithesis of isolation. Rather, it involves the use of economic, political, or cultural incentives to influence problem countries to alter their behavior in one or more realms. Such a strategy can take a variety of forms. Conditional engagement is a government-to-government affair in which the United States offers inducements to a target regime in exchange for specified changes in behavior. This was the approach favored in 1994 when the United States and North Korea entered into a framework agreement under which Pyongyang pledged to curtail its nuclear weapons development in exchange for shipments of fuel, construction of a new generation of nuclear power-generating reactors, and a degree of diplomatic normalization. In contrast, unconditional engagement is less contractual, with incentives being extended without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Unconditional engagement makes the most sense in promoting civil society in hopes of creating an environment more conducive to reform.

#### *Bargaining* and *negotiations* are the core of the topic — we internal link turn their education impacts.

Crocker 9 — Chester A. Crocker, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1981 to 1989, 2009 (“Terms of Engagement,” *New York Times*, September 14th, Available Online at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/opinion/14crocker.html?\_r=0, Accessed 07-18-2013)

While the details differ, each case of engagement has common elements. Engagement is a process, not a destination. It involves exerting pressure, by raising questions and hypothetical possibilities, and by probing the other country’s assumptions and thinking. Above all, it involves testing how far the other country might be willing to go. Properly understood, the diplomacy of engagement means raising questions that the other country may wish to avoid or be politically unable to answer. It places the ball in the other country’s court.

### QPQ Ground DA

#### QPQs are crucial aff ground — this is unique offense for our interpretation. If the aff is restricted to unconditional engagement, the neg will respond with a slew of unpredictable QPQ counterplans. This is worse:

#### 1. Time disparity — 2AC time constraints prevent in-depth aff responses, but the neg has the block to *react* and *overwhelm*.

#### 2. Solvency advocates — the standard is lower for the neg because they just need a tiny net-benefit, not a viable advantage that outweighs disads.

#### 3. New counterplans magnify the impact — affs won’t have specific “say no” cards or answers to the net-benefit. This turns their “clash” and “depth” impacts.

#### They say “stasis point,” but the neg should be prepared for conditional engagement affs. Even if the specific *quo* wasn’t expected, the neg should have strategies based on *the existence of* a *quo*.

#### They say “easier for aff,” but it’s much easier for the neg — that was above. They still get critiques, counterplans, and disadvantages based on engagement.

### Predictability DA

#### Their interpretation is overcontextualized to Europe — Smith is an EU expert writing in the context of *their* foreign policy. She’s also wrong *even in the European context* — the EU considers conditionality *part of* engagement. This evidence *assumes Smith*.

Youngs 5 — Richard Youngs, Associate Professor of International and European Politics at the University of Warwick, holds a Ph.D. in International Studies from the University of Warwick, 2005 (“Engagement: Sharpening European Influence,” *Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement*, May, Available Online at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/484.pdf, Accessed 07-28-2013, p. 8-9)

In the light of such concerns, we must assess exactly how and in what form the EU can usefully attach conditions to its forms of long-term engagement. The use of conditionality has established itself as a central element of the EU’s conception of engagement, with third country agreements now incorporating clauses relating to economic reform, democracy and human rights, cooperation on combating illegal migration, the readmission of migrants, and counter-terrorism cooperation. But, in practice, a common strategy on the actual use of conditionality must still be elaborated. When senior figures assert that the ‘rule of law’ is the distinctive European contribution to international relations they tend to mean multilateralism internationally more than muscular approaches to reforms within partner states. If economic and social engagement is not transmitting itself into effective political change, more attention must be given to ascertaining what is preventing this. Such weaknesses reflect more than the routinely mentioned internal CFSP divisions, and their correction remains elusive.

Karen Smith’s contribution to this volume paints a mixed picture of the EU’s use of conditionality. She cautions that the EU often fails to provide the kind of conditioned ‘rewards’ most desired by third countries. She also points out that, for all the much vaunted success of the ‘enlargement model’, in eastern European it was not EU conditionality in itself that convinced governments of the need to undertake reform. On the other hand, she sees the EU as already ‘comfortable’ with the use of positive conditionality. If, however, we recognise that ‘conditionality…is necessarily one coin with two sides’, often requiring more negative sticks to maintain the influence of positive carrots, then she awards the EU poorer marks in its failure to grasp such duality.

For our authors here the key is consistency in the application of conditionality. Conditionality should not be conceived as a standalone, episodic policy instrument, but act as one element in the formation of a broader orbit of attraction. Karen Smith judges the ‘double standards’ problem still to be one of the most debilitating factors undermining EU credibility in many third countries. Michael Emerson warns us that ‘perceived exclusion’ affects the [end page 8] chances for democratising and governance reforms in the states that are not drawn into the powerful mechanism of EU political conditionality. For such an orbit effectively to be created, Emerson suggests a need for equally intensive efforts across ‘seven European policy spaces’. But he does see positive signs, in this respect, in the more consistent treatment of norms under the first action plans agreed under the Neighbourhood Policy.

#### This proves our conceptual confusion argument — precise “engagement” definitions are impossible and unnecessary. Debatability is most important.

#### The EU considers conditionality *conditional engagement*.

Karliuk 11 — Maksim Karliuk, Contributing Author for the *Belarus Digest*, holds a Masters' Degree from the College of Europe in Belgium, 2011 (“EU-Belarus: Between Conditionality And Constructive Engagement,” *Belarus Digest*, June 22nd, Available Online at http://belarusdigest.com/2011/06/22/eu-belarus-between-conditionality-and-constructive-engagement, Accessed 07-26-2013)

The article rightly underlines the EU’s two-track approach consisting of conditional engagement at the official level and assistance on the civil society level. To follow the development of this approach, the article describes the history of the EU-Belarus relations in several periods. Professor Van Elsuwege correctly identifies the major breaking point in 1999 when the EU adopted a step-by-step policy. This was a manifest move from isolation to a conditional engagement.

#### The EU gets engagement with China wrong — it’s a bad strategy, not a good definition.

Fox and Godement 9 — John Fox, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, and François Godement, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009 (“Executive Summary,” *A Power Audit of EU-China Relations*, Published by the European Council on Foreign Relations, ISBN 9781906538101, Available Online at <http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR12_-_A_POWER_AUDIT_OF_EU-CHINA_RELATIONS.pdf>, Accessed 07-19-2016, p. 12-13)

The move to reciprocal engagement

Unconditional engagement with China has delivered few results for the EU, whether in the pursuit of its immediate interests or within the broader purpose of seeking Chinese convergence with European goals and values. Even the biggest Member States are finding that their attempts to secure their interests through national policies founder in the face of a stronger and better organised Chinese negotiator. The UK, despite its militant advocacy of open European markets for Chinese goods, has failed to persuade China to open up much of its financial service sector or to increase its commitment to global institutions like the IMF. France has seen its trade deficit with China explode despite its commercial diplomacy, and now fears being frozen out by China as a result of its recent stance on human rights and Tibet. Italy and Spain’s support for anti-dumping actions has not improved China’s trade practices or provided anything more than short-term respite for these countries’ textile and manufacturing industries. Germany’s strong trade relationship with China has been less detrimental to its economic interests, but the Chinese have ignored Chancellor Merkel’s insistence on more respect for human rights.

Yet the fact that the EU – often in tandem with the US – has achieved small but real changes in Chinese policy shows that China can shift its position when faced with a united EU approach on targeted issues. The EU should therefore drop its attempt to remake China through unconditional engagement and turn to a strategy that offers a realistic chance of achieving its most pressing goals. [end page 12] Unconditional engagement should make way for “reciprocal engagement”, a new interest-based approach with two principles and two criteria. The principles: European offers to China should be focused on a reduced number of policy areas, and the EU should use incentives and leverage to ensure that China will reciprocate. The criteria: relevance to the EU, and a realistic expectation that a collective European effort will shift Chinese policy.

#### Our “QPQ education” offense also *applies to Europe*.

Youngs 5 — Richard Youngs, Associate Professor of International and European Politics at the University of Warwick, holds a Ph.D. in International Studies from the University of Warwick, 2005 (“Engagement: Sharpening European Influence,” *Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement*, May, Available Online at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/484.pdf, Accessed 07-28-2013, p. 10)

Imagine successful, multi-faceted engagement in terms of the metaphor of baking a cake. The EU might be accused of using all the right ingredients, but throwing these together rather haphazardly into the oven and expecting a perfect outcome. More attention is needed to the precise combination of ingredients, the order in which each element is added, and how fine adjustments and additions are needed during preparation.

### Functional Limits

#### Functional limits prevent a race to the bottom. Solvency advocates *are* enforceable for the aff, but *aren’t* enforceable for counterplans. Theory and competition aren’t magic bullets — the neg gets the block and a diverse 1NC that prevents in-depth responses.

### Good Is Good Enough

#### Good is good enough. Don’t vote neg on topicality unless our interpretation is undebatable. It’s impossible to find the “best definition” of engagement — their model distracts from topic education.

#### They say “precision important,” but Resnick is a graduate student criticizing the number of *different definitions* of engagement. The precision he wants is impossible. Neg’s interp undermines conceptual clarity.

Capie and Evans 7 — David H. Capie, Research Fellow and Co-Director of the Armed Groups Project in the Centre for International Relations at the University of British Columbia, and Paul M. Evans, Professor at the Institute of Asian Research and Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia, 2007 (“Engagement,” *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, Published by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ISBN 9812307230, p. 115-116)

According to the Oxford Concise Dictionary, the noun engagement and the verb to engage have several different meanings. Among these, to engage can mean "to employ busily", "to hold a person's attention", "to bind by a promise (usually a marriage)", or to "come into battle with an enemy". The noun engagement can mean "the act or state of engaging or being engaged", an "appointment with another person", "a betrothal", "an encounter between hostile forces", or "a moral commitment". The gerund engaging means to be "attractive or charming". In the literature on security in the Asia-Pacific, engagement most commonly refers to policies regarding the People's Republic of China. However, the term has been used in many different ways leading to a great deal of confusion and uncertainty. A Business Week headline summed up the confusion: "Does 'engagement' mean fight or marry?"1

Although one of the most important and ubiquitous terms in the Asia-Pacific security discourse, engagement is generally under-theorized. Most of the literature on the term is either descriptive or prescriptive. There is little agreement about the meaning of engagement and considerable inconsistency in its use. The New York Times noted that "there are many definitions of engagement" and described it as a "moving target".2 This indeterminacy has prompted a host of scholars and officials to offer their own modified [end page 115] interpretations of engagement, for example deep engagement or conditional engagement. These, in turn, have arguably made for less, rather than greater conceptual clarity.

#### Reasonability is best when defining “engagement” — avoids an impossible definitional maze.

Drifte 3 — Reinhard Drifte, Professor and Chair of Japanese Studies and Director at the Newcastle East Asia Center at the University of Newcastle, 2003 (“Introduction,” *Japan's Security Relations with China Since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning?*, Published by Routledge, ISBN 1134406673, p. 5-6)

The complex nature of engagement policy

The misunderstanding of the policy of engagement gives rise to considerable confusion because it obfuscates the Realist elements of engagement, i.e. the role of force to effect balancing and hedging. In order to propose remedies to perceived deficiencies of engagement, qualifying adjectives to 'engagement', or even the coinage of new words, have been proposed which make an appropriate understanding of engagement policy even more difficult. Definitions range from unconditional engagement, conditional engagement, comprehensive or constructive engagement, robust engagement, congagement, coercive engagement, to constrainment.8 The resulting definatory maze cannot fail to make the pursuit of engagement difficult at a national level, let alone in tandem with another country. In fact engagement relies as much on Realist foundations, with their deterrence and balance-of-power elements, as on Liberal foundations, which stress the positive forces of increasing international economic interdependence and integration, the spreading of international norms, the establishment of rules and institutions to regulate and enable peaceful cooperation between nations.

The power-balancing and deterrence elements in engagement policy follow the Realist teaching that war can be avoided if there is a stable power balance, but that the shift of power relations (which China drives forward through its economic and military strengthening) is particularly dangerous for the maintenance of peace. The systemic issues for hegemonic stability are how to maintain such stability and how to accommodate change. Realists will point out that multipolar systems like those in Asia are less stable than unipolar systems. The situation in Asia has been depicted as a five-power balance-of-power system, as 'ripe for rivalry', and as heading for instability.9

The following definition of engagement by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross probably describes best the dualistic character of this policy: 'The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status-quo elements of a rising power's behaviour. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order'. The authors explicitly state that amelioration of the rising power's behaviour does not seek to limit, constrain or delay the newcomer's power, nor to prevent the development of influence commensurate with its greater power.10 They attach four conditions that will make a policy of engagement effective:

1. the new rising power has only limited revisionist aims and there are no irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the established powers;

2. the established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, i.e. a sticks and carrots policy;

3. engagement is a complement and not an alternative to balancing;

4. the established powers must live by the same principles they demand of the new rising power11

When we look carefully at this statement it becomes clear that, for the rising power, 'coercive means' must still be considered in its calculation of the [end page 5] established powers despite their goal of the non-use of 'coercive methods'. Not only is this related to the established powers' Realist objectives (i.e. balancing and hedging) vis-a-vis conceivable intentions of a rising power, but it is also, in the first instance, due to the simple fact that all the established powers, including Japan, maintain considerable military forces and are involved in military alliances to cater for a whole range of challenges to their security. The crucial issue for a correct understanding of Japan's engagement policy (and this would apply to the engagement policy of any other country) is to clarify the emphasis and the robustness with which some rather than other goals associated with engagement are pursued, as well as the mix of policy tools used; one needs to consider issues such as no unilateral use of offensive military force, peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, respect for national sovereignty, transparency of military forces, cooperative solutions for transnational problems or respect for basic human rights.12

### AT: Çelik

#### No intent to exclude — Çelik’s English is weak. Their evidence is based on a paraphrasing of Kahler and Kastner — they *explicitly include* both conditional and unconditional incentives.

Kahler and Kastner 6 — Miles Kahler, Rohr Professor of Pacific International Relations at the school of International Relations and Pacific Studies and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California-San Diego, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, and Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Maryland, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2006 (“Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies in South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan,” Draft of a Manuscript Later Published in the *Journal of Peace Research*, Available Online at <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/kastner/KahlerKastner.doc>, Accessed 05-06-2013)

Economic engagement—a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and effect an improvement in bilateral political relations—is the subject of growing, but still limited, interest in the international relations literature. The bulk of the work on economic statecraft continues to focus on coercive policies such as economic sanctions. The emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well-documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa 1994; Pollins 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how widespread strategies of economic engagement actually are: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno 2003). Furthermore, beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies in this regard have focused on policies adopted by great powers. But engagement policies adopted by South Korea and the other two states examined in this study, Singapore and Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics; instead, it may be more widespread than previously recognized.